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(Editor’s Note: The Journal of Backcountry Studies announces the publication, by 
the University Press of Virginia, of a major biography of Lord Dunmore, the last Royal 
Governor of Virginia by Dr. James Corbett David. Dunmore’s most famous exploit was 
his invasion of Native lands in the Ohio Valley, July to October, 1774.  His depiction of 
the peace settlement is a distillation of the entire book, and, with the generous permission 
of the publisher and author, we offer this excerpt as an announcement of this landmark 
study in Backcountry history. RMC) 
 
By the terms of the treaty of Camp Charlotte, the Shawnees acquiesced to the 
Ohio River boundary established without their consent at Fort Stanwix in 1768.  From 
now on, they would have to hunt on the northwest side of the river.  They were also 
ordered to return all prisoners and stolen property, including slaves and horses, and hand 
over several hostages of their own to ensure their compliance pending the negotiation of a 
permanent peace at Pittsburgh the following summer.  If all of these terms were met, 
Dunmore was “willing to bury the Hatchet” and once again protect the Shawnees “as an 
Elder Brother.”  He sought to discredit reports that the Delawares had caused the war 
through treachery, urging the Shawnees “to bury in oblivion these idle prejudices against 
your Grand Fathers the Delawares, & see each other on your former friendly terms.” 
With the Fort Stanwix cession evidently secured, Dunmore thus sought to restore the 
political relations that, he believed, best promoted peace and order, albeit on Virginia’s 
terms.  He officially proclaimed the cessation of hostilities in January 1775.  The 
Shawnees had agreed not to hunt south of the Ohio and to honor white navigation rights 
on the river.  In return, they would “be protected from all injury” whenever they had 
occasion to pass through Virginia territory. “Any violence upon” Indians, no matter what 
their “Tribe or Nation,” was now expressly forbidden. 
The Camp Charlotte settlement was not perfect, nor could it have been.  It did not 
involve the Cherokees, who were also deeply concerned in Kentucky, and did nothing to 
pacify the Mingoes.  There were even a few Shawnees who refused to accept it.  
Virginians who wanted to exact revenge for Point Pleasant or to extend the Fort Stanwix 
cession thought it too forgiving.  No settlement could have satisfied all these groups at 
once.  Even so, the Camp Charlotte treaty was widely praised for what it did achieve.  
Thomas Gage, once critical of Dunmore’s activities in the west, approved the “very 
Moderate Terms” of the peace.  The Virginia council was also impressed by its “lenity.” 
The Indians had likely braced for “the cruelty of the victor,” the councilmen wrote, but 
Dunmore “taught them a lesson which the savage breast was a stranger to – that 
clemency and mercy are not incompatible with power.” (That the Mingoes seemed not to 
appreciate this “lesson” went unacknowledged.) Even Arthur St. Clair, the leading 
Pennsylvanian in the region, was pleased.  He conceded that the war had “come to a 
much better end than there was any reason to have expected.” 
Returning east from Indian country, the officers who had served under Dunmore 
stopped at Fort Gower.  Out from under the governor’s gaze (he went his own way 
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home), they drafted several resolutions strongly supporting the Continental Congress’s 
impending boycott of commerce with Great Britain.  The officers’ patriotism did not 
prevent them from expressing gratitude to Dunmore.  He had undergone “the great 
fatigue of this singular campaign,” they wrote, “from no other motive than the true 
interest of this country.”  Others, then and now, have not been so sure. 
An air of conspiracy has always surrounded Dunmore’s War.  Edmund Pendleton 
suspected that the Yellow Creek massacre was calculated to provoke Indian raids, which 
could then serve as a pretext for a war that would introduce white settlement north of the 
Ohio.  Pendleton never revealed who he thought might be behind such a scheme, but the 
proprietors of the Grand Ohio Company were eager to believe any rumor implicating 
Dunmore, whom they blamed (improbably) for delaying approval of Vandalia.  During 
the first Continental Congress, Patrick Henry allegedly discussed the “secret springs” of 
Dunmore’s then-upcoming expedition with Thomas Wharton, a Company principal.  
Wharton said that Henry had told him that since “his Lordship was determined to settle 
his family in America, he was really pursueing this war, in order to obtain by purchase or 
treaty from the natives a tract of territory” north of the river.  These men imagined that 
Dunmore had designs on what is now that state of Ohio in addition to the lands acquired 
at Fort Stanwix.  The Camp Charlotte settlement likely disabused them of this notion, but 
the Revolution added new suspicions to the mix.  Some colonists came to believe that 
Dunmore had pursued the war in order to distract them from the Coercive Acts.  There 
were even those who thought that he had colluded with the Shawnees in their attack on 
Lewis.  It was in the dim light of this delusion that Point Pleasant came to be known, in 
the nineteenth century, as the first battle of the American Revolution. 
Dunmore has retained the role of villain in modern scholarship.  One recent study 
holds that he manufactured the war with the Shawnees in order to enrich land speculators.  
The governor was clearly a savvier participant in western affairs than his reputation for 
incompetence allows, but it is doubtful that anyone could have orchestrated the remote 
and complicated series of events that led to Point Pleasant.  Even if he had done so, 
speculators didn’t gain anything worth the efforts from the Camp Charlotte settlement.  
Some, like Patrick Henry, viewed it as a disappointment – another example, according to 
Simon Schama, of “the Crown’s suffocating determination to confine their territorial 
expansion.” As whites in London and Virginia saw things, the land south of the Ohio 
River already belonged to the crown under the terms of the Treaty of Fort Stanwix.  
Dunmore merely forced the Shawnees to acknowledge this. 
That he aggressively pursued Virginia’s interest in the Ohio Valley, at times in 
violation of his instructions, is beyond question.  He seized upon disorder in and around 
Pittsburgh to strengthen Virginia’s position vis-à-vis Pennsylvania and Vandalia.  And 
though he never made any grants to himself during this period, he was no innocent in the 
world of land speculation.  In spite of all of this, there is no evidence linking either him or 
Connolly to the April 1774 murders that set Logan and his Shawnee allies on the 
warpath.  Both men criticized those atrocities and, along with everyone else, proceeded to 
focus on the raids they provoked rather than the prosecution of Cresap and Greathouse.  
In the final analysis, Dunmore’s War resulted not from a shadowy conspiracy but from 
the convergence of a number of powerful North American interests – the Six Nations, the 
Virginia government, independent settlers – in opposition to a loosely connected 
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collection of weaker interests, including the Ohio Indians, proprietary Pennsylvania, and 
the ministry in London. 
Colonial governance required autonomy and improvisation from far-flung 
officials.  The information lag alone – letters took anywhere from three weeks to three 
months to reach London from Williamsburg – made it nearly impossible to manage 
colonial affairs from Whitehall, where instructions often had to percolate through a 
variety of channels before being shipped across the Atlantic.  Once the orders did arrive, 
ever-changing local circumstances often precluded their institution.  Authorities in 
Williamsburg faced similar obstacles while trying to govern the backcountry.  The 
importance of native diplomatic discourse, including scalping, made places like the Ohio 
Valley culturally as well as geographically remote from imperial centers.  The state’s 
dependence on people who could operate in this milieu – William Johnson, George 
Croghan, Alexander McKee, John Connolly – often compromised its goals.  It was hard 
enough for these men to control events, let alone someone hundreds or even thousands of 
miles away who didn’t speak the language.  The state’s principal leverage was its ability 
to grant legal title to land.  The exercise of this power was both a sign and a source of 
weakness, for by promising grants in the acquisition of consent, the state encouraged 
colonists to move west well in advance of its ability to control them there.  As all of this 
suggests, one need not focus on the progress of the colonial resistance movement to see 
that the imperial order was little more than a precarious illusion in North America by 
1774. 
On Christmas Eve, Dunmore wrote the most important letter of his life.  A 
response to the accusations he encountered on his return home, it contained an exhaustive 
self-defense and related new developments in the mounting crisis over colonial rights.  
One of the letter’s main themes was the troubling independence of colonists throughout 
Virginia.  “The established Authority of any Government in America, and the Policy of 
Government at home,” he wrote, “are both insufficient to restrain the Americans” in their 
movement west.  He had observed this first hand; it was incontrovertible.  Matters were 
also desperate at the capital, where “the Power of Government” was now “entirely 
disregarded, if not wholly overturned.” Despite its pessimistic tone, the letter managed to 
restore the ministry’s confidence in Dunmore’s administration.  The following March, 
Dartmouth reported that there was “no room in the Royal Bureau to doubt of the 
uprightness of your Lordship’s Intentions.” 
Whitehall had very little reason to regret the outcome of Dunmore’s War.  It was 
unauthorized and risky, and if handled with less finesse, it might well have strengthened 
the prospects for a north-south native alliance.  Instead, it affirmed the Treaty of Fort 
Stanwix while shoring up relations with the Indians at a time when the Empire badly 
needed friends in the backcountry.  Strictly speaking, it did nothing to prevent the 
government from proceeding with its plans for Vandalia.  There was a downside, as well, 
of course.  Dunmore’s War gave heart to settlers and speculators who had transgressed 
the Proclamation Line and probably encouraged others to do so.  Like so much else in 
western affairs, it was at once complicating and clarifying.  As the Empire tried in vain to 
manage its own growth, mixed signals were inevitable. 
 
